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In with New Families, Out with Bad Law: Determining the
Rights of Known Sperm Donors Through Intent-Based Written
Agreements
MARIA E. GARCIA*
I. INTRODUCTION
U.S. society is changing. Just turn on the television and see. Each week,
millions of devoted fans tune in to shows like “Modern Family” and “The New
Normal,” which portray the lives of “non-traditional families,” including samesex couples with adopted children, surrogate mothers, and single parents.1 The
market for television shows that feature “non-traditional families” demonstrates
that U.S. society and values concerning the “traditional family” are changing and
accepted.2
Presently, U.S. society is no longer confined by the “Leave it to Beaver”3
conception of the traditional family unit. Statistical data gathered in the 2010
U.S. Census demonstrates that over the last ten years, husband-wife households
made up less than 50% of all U.S. households for the first time in U.S. history,
while unmarried opposite sex households increased by 40%, and same-sex
households increased by 80%.4 In accordance with popular culture’s evolution of
the family unit, U.S. law has also evolved to reflect the rise of “non-traditional

Copyright © 2014 by Maria E. Garcia
* J.D., Duke University School of Law 2014.
1. See Rick Kissel, ‘Modern Family’ Tops, ‘American Idol’ Hits Series Low on Wednesday, VARIETY
(May 2, 2013, 9:21 AM), variety.com/2013/tv/news/modern-family-tops-american-idol-hits-serieslow-on-wednesday-1200440486/ (indicating that 9.5 million viewers watched “Modern Family” on a
particular night). “Modern Family” centers on the Pritchett family, which consists of Jay, the father,
Mitchell, the son, and Claire, the daughter. Jay is in his second marriage to a much younger woman,
Gloria, who has a pre-teen son of her own. Jay and Gloria also have a child of their own. Mitchell is
gay and has a partner named Cameron. They have an adopted baby girl. Claire is married to Phil,
and they have three children. “The New Normal” centers on a gay couple, Bryan and David, who are
seeking to welcome a baby into their lives. They find Goldie, a single mother of a nine-year-old, who
agrees to be their gestational surrogate. Bryan, David, and Goldie develop a close friendship.
Goldie’s mother is very much involved in her daughter and granddaughter’s lives.
2. See Jessica R. Feinberg, Friends as Co-Parents, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 799, 803 (2009) (“Census
officials note that ‘the increasing prevalence of non-traditional family structures reflects powerful
societal trends that cannot be easily reversed.’”).
3. “Leave it to Beaver” was a 1950s sitcom that featured a suburban, “all-American family”
comprised of a professional father, a stay-at-home mother, and their two sons. See Leave it to Beaver,
IMDB. http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0050032/ (last visited Oct 6, 2013).
4. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSEHOLDS AND FAMILIES: 2010 5–6 (Apr. 2012), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-14.pdf. In addition, between 2000 and 2010,
the number of female households with no spouse present and with own children increased by 10.6%
and the number of male households with no spouse present and with own children increased by
27.3%.
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families.” For instance, eleven states and Washington D.C. recognize same-sex
couples’ right to marry.5 However, the law has not evolved as rapidly in other
areas of family law that directly affect the construction of “non-traditional
families.” One such area is artificial insemination and the rights of sperm
donors.
Motherhood among lesbian women and single, unmarried heterosexual
women is increasing in the U.S.6 This is in part due to scientific advancements in
assisted reproductive technology (ART) and its growing use.7 Many women
wishing to conceive do so through artificial insemination using a sperm donor.8
While many women choose to be inseminated with semen from an anonymous
donor, others use semen from a known donor.9 A woman’s preference for a
known donor may stem from her increased opportunity to observe the behavior
and characteristics of a man she knows, access his medical history, and reduce
the costs associated with the procedure.10
The law is well settled that anonymous donors relinquish their parental
rights. As such, they cannot be sued for child support and cannot sue for
parental rights.11 However, the law regarding parentage and the rights of known
donors is somewhat nebulous and often outdated. This note discusses the issues
arising from these laws and the need for reform.
The conflict of determining parentage and the rights of known sperm
donors occurs primarily in two scenarios.12 In the first scenario, the recipient-

5. See FREEDOM TO MARRY, Freedomtomarry.org/states (last visited Oct 6, 2013) (listing
Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode
Island, Vermont, and Washington as states permitting same-sex marriage). Note that over the four
month period I wrote this note, the number of states permitting same-sex marriage jumped from 9 to
11 states, with RI and DE added to the list this May, demonstrating how rapidly our acceptance of
“non-traditional” families is moving forward.
6. Justyn Lezin, (Mis)Conceptions: Unjust Limitations on Legally Unmarried Women’s Access to
Reproductive Technology and Their Use of Known Donors, 14 HASTINGS’ WOMEN’S L.J. 185, 188 (2003).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Lezin, supra note 6, at 188; see also In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025, 1029 (Kan. 2007) (where an
unmarried female was artificially inseminated using semen from her friend); Ferguson v. McKiernan,
940 A.2d 1236, 1238 (Pa. 2007) (where an unmarried female was artificially inseminated using semen
from a former romantic partner).
10. See Browne Lewis, Two Fathers, One Dad: Allocating the Parental Obligations Between the Men
Involved in the Artificial Insemination Process, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 949, 978-79 (2009) (noting that a
woman may “be more comfortable using the sperm of a man she knows because she has been able to
observe his behavior and ascertain his character . . . it [is] easier for the child to obtain his or her
medical history . . . [and] the use of a known sperm donor eliminates the cost of the sperm and makes
the use of a physician optional.”); see also Elizabeth E. McDonald, Sperm Donor or Thwarted Father?
How Written Agreement Statutes are Changing the Way Courts Resolve Legal Parentage Issues in Assisted
Reproduction Cases, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 340, 340 (2009) (noting that modern users of ART often receive
sperm from known donors such as “male friends or acquaintances . . . selected for a variety of
reasons, including healthy medical histories or prestigious graduate degrees.”).
11. See, e.g., Woodward v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 270 n.23 (Mass. 2002) (stating
that anonymous sperm donors sign contracts relinquishing their parental rights which is a practice
that the majority of states follow) (citation omitted).
12. I have arrived at the existence of these two scenarios based on my own research and reading
of cases. I found these two scenarios to be the most prevalent causes of litigation regarding this
matter.
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mother approaches a known donor and the parties agree that the known donor
will relinquish all parental rights and responsibilities if a child is conceived. The
recipient-mother agrees that she will not seek to hold the known donor
responsible for financial or emotional support regarding the child. In this
scenario, the legal system becomes involved when the recipient-mother reneges
on this agreement and files a claim against the known donor for child support.
In the second scenario, a recipient-mother approaches a known donor and
the parties agree that the known donor will have continued involvement in the
child’s life. This can range from full parental rights to visitation rights.
However, after the child’s birth, the recipient-mother terminates the relationship
between the known donor and the child and contests the existence or
enforceability of any agreement. It is important to note that in both the first and
second scenario, the facts are often unclear as to whether there was an agreement
between the parties or what the terms of any alleged agreement may be.
This note examines the issues involved in determining parental and donor
rights when mothers-to-be enter into agreements with known sperm donors.
First, in section II, I discuss the evolution of the Uniform Parentage Act of 1973
from its conception in 1973 to its most recent articulation in 2002. In section III, I
briefly explain the intent-based approach to determining donor’s rights. In
section VI, I critique two types of state statutes that are applicable to parentage
determinations in known-donor cases: licensed physician statutes and written
agreement opt-out statutes. In section V, I discuss the two scenarios mentioned
above in which litigation ensues, and a donor’s rights and obligations are called
into question. In section VI, I discuss the Supreme Court’s decision in Troxel v.
Granville and the challenge it may present to known-donors seeking visitation.
In the note’s conclusion, I propose that the best approach to determining parental
rights for known-donors is an intent-based model memorialized in a formal
written contract enforceable in a court of law.
II. THE UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT OF 1973 AND 2002
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted
the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) in 1973.13 Currently, the 1973 UPA remains in
effect in thirteen states, although some of these states have amended the act since
its initial adoption.14 The 1973 UPA contains the following provision regarding
the parental status of a donor: “The donor of semen provided to a licensed
physician for use in artificial insemination of a married woman other than the
donor’s wife is treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child
thereby conceived.”15 This provision was designed to protect the married
couples’ parental rights to a child conceived through artificial insemination.16

13. See UNIF. LAW COMMISSION, http://uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Parentage%20Act (last
visited Oct 6, 2013). One of the principle reasons that the UPA was drafted was to provide the same
rights to children born to unmarried parents as those provided to marital children.
14. John J. Sampson, Uniform Family Laws and Model Acts, 42 FAM. L.Q. 673, 681 (2008) (noting
that California, Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New
Jersey, Ohio, and Rhode Island still retain versions of the 1973 UPA).
15. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(b) (1973).
16. See Justice Carol A. Beier & Larkin E. Walsh, Is What We Want What We Need, and Can We Get
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However, the 1973 UPA provisions do not apply to unmarried women who
undergo artificial insemination. This, as well as advancements in ART and legal
developments over approximately 30 years,17 led to the drafting of the 2002
UPA.18
The 2002 UPA takes a broader approach to parentage issues and governs
ART for both married and unmarried women.19 The 2002 UPA also uses a
gender-neutral approach to ART by using the unqualified term “donor,” without
specifying a sperm or egg donor.20 Another significant change in the 2002 UPA
is its modification of the parental status of a donor provision quoted above. The
2002 UPA simply states: “A donor is not a parent of a child conceived by means
of assisted reproduction.”21 An important divergence from the 1973 UPA is that
the 2002 Act does not require that a sperm donor provide his semen to a
physician in order to relinquish his parental rights and obligations.22 This
distinction will be discussed in greater detail in section VI. Currently, eight
states have enacted the 2002 UPA.23 Among those eight states, Alabama is the
only one to transition from the 1973 UPA to the 2002 UPA.24
The differences between the 1973 UPA and 2002 UPA are important
because, as mentioned, many states still utilize the outdated 1973 UPA.25 This is
problematic since, unless amended, the 1973 UPA’s ART provisions apply only

it in Writing? The Third-Wave of Feminism Hits the Beach of Modern Parentage Presumptions, 39 U. BALT.
L.F. 26, 29 (2008) (noting that the design of the 1973 UPA was intended, in part, to “protect the
expectations of married couples.”)
17. See Sampson, supra note 14, at 680-681.
18. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT Prefatory Note (2002) (noting a “thoroughgoing revision of the
Act” is warranted by the recent scientific advances and the states’ “widely differing treatment” on
subjects both covered and uncovered by the Act.)
19. Id. at § 702 cmt.
20. Id. at § 702.
21. Id.
22. Id. at § 702 cmt. (“This section shields all donors, whether of sperm or eggs, . . .from
parenthood in all situations in which either a married woman or a single woman conceives a child
through ART with the intent to be the child’s parent, either by herself or with a man.”).
23. Sampson, supra note 14, at 681 (noting that Alabama, Delaware, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming have adopted the 2002 UPA).
24. Id.
25. See Kristine S. Knaplund, Children of Assisted Reproduction, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 899, 908–
09 (2012) (noting that courts struggle to apply outdated laws in ART disputes and going on to discuss
the UPA). The following states retain the 1973 UPA’s licensed physician requirement and still limit
the ART statute to a married woman: Colorado, Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, and Nevada.
See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-106 (West 2009); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/3 (West 2013); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West 2013); MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.824 (West 2012); MONT. CODE ANN. 40-6-106
(West 2013); NEV. REV. STAT. 126.061 (West 2011). Hawaii and Rhode Island do not appear to have a
statute regulating ART. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 584-1 (West 2013) & R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-8-1 (West
2013). California and Kansas retain the licensed physician requirement but the law applies to both
married and single women, and contains written agreement opt-out provisions. See CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 7613 (West 2013) & KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2208 (West 2012). California’s statute in particular
provides for an “assisted reproduction agreement” allowing a donor to retain parental rights based
on intent. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7606 (West 2013). New Jersey and Ohio retain the licensed physician
requirement but it applies to married and single women. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West 2013)
and OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.90, 3111.95 (West 2013).
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to married women and require physician involvement.26 Thus, under the 1973
UPA, when a donor provides a woman with sperm directly, rather than through
a licensed physician, or when an unmarried woman uses a sperm donor to
conceive, the UPA is inapplicable and a donor has not relinquished parental
rights to the child.27 This situation can be the catalyst for litigation regarding the
parentage of a child conceived through artificial insemination. The issues
presented by the 1973 and 2002 UPA demonstrate why an intent-based model for
determining parentage and donor’s rights should be the critical lens through
which current ART and donor paternity statutes should be viewed.
III. AN INTENT-BASED APPROACH TO DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF KNOWN DONORS
The intent-based approach to rights of known donors is almost identical to
the intent-based approach to parentage. Professor John Lawrence Hill defines
intended parents as “the person or couple who initially intended to raise the
child.”28 In other words, the intended parents are the parties who “affirmatively
intended the birth of the child,” “took the steps necessary to effect” ART, and
“[b]ut for their acted-on intention, the child would not exist.”29 The intent-based
approach to parentage determines the identity of the intended parents and
legally enforces those intentions by declaring those parties legal parents.
The intent-based model to determine parentage can also be used to
determine the rights of known donors, which may or may not include legal
parentage. In artificial insemination cases, a known donor may relinquish
parental rights, retain full parental rights, or establish visitation rights without
parental rights. Regardless of the agreement, a court should examine the parties’
intentions and determine the agreed upon relationship between the donor and
the child. The court should then assign rights to the donor accordingly.
As I will discuss more fully, a formal written contract memorializes the
intent of both parties while also capturing the best interests of the child. This is
because the formal, written contract makes clear which individuals are dedicated
to the upbringing and care of the child, and therefore it can be assumed they
have the child’s best interests at heart.30 Thus, an intent-based approach to
determining rights of known donors is best because it honors the wishes of the
parties and the construction of their “non-traditional family,” while also
protecting the best interests of the child.

26. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (1973).
27. See Knaplund, supra note 25, at 908-09 (detailing how the 1973 UPA determined paternity
only in situations where a man provided sperm to a licensed physician “for use by a married woman
who was not the donor’s wife.”).
28. John Lawrence Hill, What Does it Mean to be a “Parent”? The Claims of Biology as the Basis for
Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 356 n.12 (1991); see also Johnson v. Calvert, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 494,
500 (Cal. 1993) (en banc) (citing to Professor Hill’s work and finding that in a surrogacy case, the
woman who intended to bring about the birth of the child and intended to raise the child as her own
was the natural mother).
29. Calvert, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 500.
30. See McDonald, supra note 10, at 348 (explaining that written contracts designed to capture
intent to parent establish care giving and parenting intention as essential determinates of parentage).
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IV. TYPES OF STATUTES
This section will focus on two different statutory schemes regulating ART
and donors’ parental status. Licensed physician requirement statutes and written
agreement opt-out statutes demonstrate which statutory scheme best honors the
intent of the parties involved when known donor paternity and rights become
the subject of litigation.
A. Licensed Physician Requirement
In 2009, William Marotta of Topeka, Kansas answered Angela Bauer and
Jennifer Schreiner’s Craigslist ad seeking a sperm donor.31 Marotta provided the
lesbian couple with his sperm and signed a contract waiving all parental rights
and financial responsibility to the couple’s child.32 Marotta, who was not
compensated for his donation, left thinking he had performed a good deed.33
Schreiner and Bauer successfully performed an at-home insemination and
Schreiner gave birth to a baby girl.34 However, since then, Marotta has found
good reason to quote the well-known saying, “No good deed goes
unpunished.”35
In 2012, after Bauer and Schreiner ended their relationship, Schreiner sought
public benefits for the child.36 In Kansas, when a single mother seeks welfare for
a child, it is common for the Kansas Department for Children and Families to
locate the child’s biological father and order him to pay support.37 In Marotta’s
words, Schreiner was “coerced” and “pressured” by the State to identify him as
the biological father.38 The State immediately filed a petition for child support
against Marotta, identifying him as the legal father of Schreiner and Bauer’s
daughter.39 Marotta has never provided financial support for the child, has only
seen her twice, and is not in any way involved in her life.40
Even though Marotta signed a contract relinquishing his parental rights to
Bauer and Schreiner’s daughter, Kansas law recognizes him as the child’s legal

31. See KS Sperm Donor Could be Forced to Pay Child Support (Fox News television broadcast),
available at http://marottacase.com/index.php/component/k2/item/18-kan-sperm-donor-could-beforced-to-pay-child-support (interviewing Marotta regarding his legal battles with Schreiner)
[hereinafter Fox News television broadcast]; see also Sperm Donor Liable for Child Support (CNN television
broadcast), available at http://marottacase.com/index.php/component/k2/item/19-cnn-newsroominterview-sperm-donor-liable-for-child-support (profiling Marotta’s donation and subsequent legal
battles) [hereinafter CNN television broadcast]. LS Rule 1.2 and 18.2.2.
32. Fox News television broadcast, supra note 31.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. Id.
37. John Hanna, William Marotta, Kansas Sperm Donor to Lesbian Couple, Fighting Child Support
Payments, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Jan.
2, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2013/01/02/william-marotta_n_2395412.html.
38. Fox News television broadcast, supra note 31.
39. See id.
40. Fox News television broadcast, supra note 31. Accordingly, when Marotta was asked in a CNN
interview if he would seek rights towards the child if ordered to pay child support, he replied, “No,
because I’m not her parent. That’s Jennifer and Angie.” See CNN television broadcast, supra note 31.
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father. This is because the applicable Kansas statute, which relieves sperm
donors of their parental rights and responsibilities, requires a physician be
involved in the insemination process.41 The Kansas statue reads:
The donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial
insemination of a woman other than the donor’s wife is treated in law as if he
were not the birth father of a child thereby conceived, unless agreed to in writing
by the donor and the woman.42

The Kansas statute is nearly identical to the outdated 1973 UPA, which also
requires physician involvement in the insemination process in order for a
donor’s parental rights to be waived.43 Other states, such as those that have
enacted the 2002 UPA, have removed the licensed physician requirement.44
Licensed physician requirements can lead to determinations of known donor
rights contrary to the parties’ intent when a recipient-mother uses a known
donor in artificial insemination and fails to involve a physician in the procedure.
There are several reasons why women choose to self-inseminate rather than
involve a physician. Physician-performed inseminations can be prohibitively
expensive and are not generally covered by health insurance.45 While the actual
insemination itself is not that costly, there can be associated medical bills for
necessities such as ultrasounds, blood work, and fertility drugs, which quickly
add up. Also, often times, more than one attempt at insemination may be
needed.46 For many women, this process is unaffordable, especially when athome insemination is a comparatively simple and inexpensive procedure.47
In addition, the licensed physician requirement may make donors reluctant
to donate to women who choose to self-inseminate.48 In a state with a licensed
physician requirement, donors are not protected from parental responsibilities
when insemination occurs at home. Therefore, there is a greater chance known

41. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2208(f) (West 2012).
42. Id. (emphasis added).
43. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(b) (1973); see supra Section II.
44. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 (2002); see supra Section II.
45. See How Much Does Artificial Insemination Cost, COSTHELPER, health.costhelper.com/artificialinsemination.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2013) (noting it is common for insurers to exclude coverage of
artificial insemination).
46. See Lucy R. Dollens, Artificial Insemination: Right of Privacy and the Difficulty in Maintaining
Donor Anonymity, 35 IND. L. REV. 213, 214 (2001) (explaining that doctor performed insemination costs
between $235 and $400 before blood work and medicine performed); see also How Much Does Artificial
Insemination Cost, COSTHELPER, health.costhelper.com/artificial-insemination.html (last visited Oct. 6,
2013) (noting that artificial insemination can range from $300-$500 per attempt and that the success
rate is 10 to 20 percent, meaning that up to 10 attempts could be required before conception). Note
that the medical costs of artificial insemination will vary from woman to woman based on her
medical needs and the facility she chooses. Of course, whether or not a procedure is deemed
“expensive” is also relative to the personal financial situation of each woman. Thus, artificial
insemination may not be “expensive” for every woman but it certainly could be for some.
47. See Lezin, supra note 6, at 191 & n. 21 (noting that standard vaginal insemination is “often
easily performed outside medical settings” and many women use the so-called “turkey-baster”
method); see also E.E. v. O.M.G.R., 420 N.J. Super. 283, 285 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2011) (“Plaintiff is
a single woman . . . [who] did not wish to assume the expense of purchasing sperm through a sperm
bank or use a licensed physician in order to effect the insemination.”).
48. Lewis, supra note 10, at 984.
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donors can be sued for paternity and child support.49 Thus, because of the law,
many women who cannot meet the licensed physician requirement are hindered
or foreclosed from having children.50
The licensed physician requirement is not only an unnecessary burden to
women; in many cases, strict adherence fails to properly honor the rights of
known donors and recipient-mothers. When the licensed physician requirement
is not met, courts may find that the donor did not relinquish parental rights and
can be ordered to pay child support. Such a result disregards the parties’ intent
and is disrespectful to the family structure that the parties seek to create.
Two cases, Jhordan C. v. Mary K. and E.E. v. O.M.G.R., demonstrate the
unfavorable outcomes that the licensed physician requirement can have on
known donors and recipient-mothers. Although Jhordan C. is a 1986 decision and
California law has since been modified, its facts and analysis are still relevant
today, as courts today continue to rely on it for guidance.51
Jhordan C. dealt with a California artificial insemination statute that
contained a licensed physician requirement. The statute stated: “The donor of
semen provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial insemination of a
woman other than the donor’s wife is treated in law as if he were not the natural
father of a child thereby conceived.”52 The facts were as follows: Mary and her
partner Victoria decided to have a child through artificial insemination and to
raise the child together.53 The couple met Jhordan through mutual friends and
chose him as their sperm donor.54 The parties’ versions of their pre-insemination
oral agreement were conflicting.55 According to Mary, she told Jhordan she did
not want a donor who would have continued involvement with the child after
his birth.56 However, once the child was born she permitted Jhordan to see the
child to “satisfy his curiosity.”57 According to Jhordan, he and Mary agreed he
would have continued involvement with the child and he would care for the
child two or three times per week.58 The parties’ pre-insemination oral
agreement was not formalized into a written agreement, nor did either party
seek legal advice.59 Nevertheless, Jhordan provided his sperm to Mary and she
performed an at-home self-insemination and became pregnant.60
At trial, although the parties disputed the terms of their oral agreement,
they agreed on the following facts:61 During Mary’s pregnancy, Jhordan visited
her at work, took photographs of her, told her he obtained a playpen, crib, and
49. See CNN television broadcast, supra note 31 (when Marotta is asked if he would do this again
had he known what would happen, he responds, “Probably not.”).
50. Lewis, supra note 10, at 984.
51. See E.E. v. O.M.G.R., 420 N.J. Super. at 289.
52. Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386, 392 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
53. Id. at 389.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 390.
61. Id.
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high chair for her child, told her he started a trust fund for the child, and stated
that he wanted to be the child’s legal guardian in case Mary died.62 Mary told
Jhordan to keep the baby items at his home, and denied his request for
guardianship, but approved of the trust fund.63 Jhordan was not involved in
Mary’s pre-natal care; rather, Victoria accompanied Mary to her medical
appointments.64 However, when the child was born, Jhordan was listed on the
child’s birth certificate.65 Jhordan visited the child the day after he was born and
took pictures of him.66 Five days later, he called Mary to see if he could visit the
child again.67 While Mary initially resisted, she allowed Jhordan to visit.68 At
that time, Jhordan claimed a right to see the child and Mary agreed to monthly
visits.69 Jhordan visited the child on about five more occasions before Mary
terminated the visits.70 Soon after, Jhordan filed suit against Mary to establish
paternity and visitation rights.71 The trial court declared Jhordan the child’s legal
father and granted him visitation.72 Mary and Victoria appealed the trial court’s
decision.
On appeal, the court focused its analysis on the licensed physician
requirement of the California statute, since Mary’s self-insemination was noncompliant with the statute. The court described the statute’s provisions as
“derived almost verbatim from the [1973] UPA.”73 The court then gave two
justifications for the licensed physician requirement.74
First, physician
involvement allows a doctor to obtain the complete medical history of the donor
and screen for disease.75 Second, the physician is a “professional third-party”
who, for evidentiary purposes, can “create a formal, documented structure for
the donor-recipient relationship” in case a dispute arises between the donor and
recipient.76 The court went on to admit that “nothing inherent in artificial
insemination requires the involvement of a physician” as it is a simple procedure
easily performed at home.77 In addition, the court recognized that the licensed
physician requirement may “offend a woman’s sense of privacy and
reproductive autonomy, might result in burdensome costs to some women, and
might interfere with a woman’s desire to conduct the procedure in a comfortable
environment such as her own home or to choose the donor herself.”78 Yet still,

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 391.
Id. at 392.
Id. at 393.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 393-94.
Id. at 394.
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the appellate court found that because the parties did not comply with the
licensed physician requirement, Jhordan had not relinquished his parental rights,
and thus, Jhordan was the legal father of Mary’s child.79
First, Jhordan demonstrates why oral agreements regarding known donor
insemination are problematic. Jhordan and Mary gave conflicting testimony
about the terms of their oral agreement.80 From the start, the court had few
concrete facts to help determine what the parties had agreed to and what
Jhordan’s rights should be. The court’s interpretation of the facts would have
been aided by a formal, written agreement between the parties.
Second, the decision in Jhordan C. does not honor the parties’ intent.
Although the factual dispute makes it more difficult to determine the parties’
intentions, the parties agreed that Mary became pregnant with the intention of
parenting her child with Victoria.81 The facts indicate that Mary and Victoria
were co-parenting the child, who spent at least two days a week at Victoria’s
home and spoke with her by phone on the days they were apart.82 Mary and
Victoria discussed their child daily and made joint decisions about his care and
upbringing.83 The women and their child took vacations together, and the child
regarded Victoria’s parents as his grandparents.84 Thus, even though the facts
suggest that Mary and Victoria might have agreed to an ongoing relationship
between Jhordan and their child, as evidenced by Mary’s acceptance of the trust
fund and acquiescence to monthly visitation, it does not seem likely that the
parties agreed to Jhordan retaining full legal status as a parent.85 Even Jhordan
never claims that he was to be the child’s legal parent, but rather that he would
have an ongoing relationship with the child.86
Thus, assuming that the parties’ intentions were for Mary and Victoria to be
parents, and for Jhordan to have an ongoing relationship with the child, the
appellate court’s reliance on the licensed physician requirement and grant of
legal parentage to Jhordan does not honor the parties’ intentions. By considering
the licensed physician requirement as the lynchpin in determining parentage, the
court disregards the parties’ intentions as well as the best interests of the child.
Since Jhordan, California has amended its parentage act to create a statutory
scheme that now borrows from both the 1973 UPA and the 2002 UPA.87 While
California still requires physician involvement in artificial insemination for the
relinquishment of donor’s parental rights to be effective, the law now provides
that a donor can retain parental rights if this decision is “agreed to in a writing
signed by the donor and the woman prior to the conception of the child.”88 In
addition, California law now defines an “assisted reproduction agreement” as “a

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 398.
Id. at 389.
Id.
Id. at 391.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 389-91.
See id. at 389.
See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (2012).
Id. at § 7613(b) (2012).
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written contract that includes a person who intends to be a legal parent of a child
or children born through assisted reproduction and that defines the terms of the
relationship between the parties to the contract.”89 Also, California law provides
that a party to the assisted reproduction agreement may bring an action to
establish the parent-child relationship “consistent with the intent expressed in
that assisted reproduction agreement.”90 Thus, California’s addition of a written
provision requirement in determining donor paternity utilizes an intent-based
approach by regarding the written agreement as a memorial of the parties’
intentions and mechanism to enforce these intentions. While this does not
circumvent the licensed physician requirement, it does defer to the parties’ intent
where there is a written agreement.91
Although California laws regarding ART have evolved since Jhordan, recent
court decisions still look to Jhordan for guidance. For instance, in E.E. v.
O.M.G.R., a 2011 New Jersey Superior Court dealt with a case where E.E., a
single woman, performed an at-home insemination with her friend, O.M.G.R.’s
sperm donation.92 E.E. opted for at-home insemination because she did not wish
to accrue the expenses of acquiring sperm from a sperm bank or a physician.93
After E.E. became pregnant, she and O.M.G.R. entered into a notarized, written
contract where E.E. would be the “sole parent and provider for the child” while
relinquishing O.M.G.R. of “financial or emotional support” as well as parental
rights.94 In addition, after the child’s birth, E.E. and O.M.G.R. signed a consent
order in which O.M.G.R. relinquished parental rights and responsibilities and
E.E. assumed all financial and emotional responsibility for the child.95 However,
the court denied the motion for termination of O.M.G.R.’s parental rights
because the parties did not comply with the licensed physician requirement, and
O.M.G.R. did not relinquish parental rights.96 As such, O.M.G.R. was the child’s
legal parent.97
Concluding that New Jersey’s ART statutes did not apply, the court
analyzed this case outside the context of artificial insemination, and instead as a
matter of child custody, as if the parties had conceived a child through sexual
intercourse.98 This is part of the danger in the strict application of licensed
physician statutes, where courts resort to application of law that is not meant to
apply to artificial insemination cases.
The court began with the premise that “a child has the right to the security

89. Id. at § 7606.
90. Id. at § 7630(f).
91. Furthermore, California law has made great strides in applying the intent-based model in
other areas of ART, like surrogacy. See Johnson v. Calvert, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 494, 500 (Cal. 1993) (en
banc) (using intent to determine parentage in a surrogacy case). (KR Rule 10).
92. E.E. v. O.M.G.R., 420 N.J. Super. 283, 285-86 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2011).
93. Id. at 285.
94. Id. at 286.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 293-94.
97. Id.
98. See id. at 293 (noting that although donor has parental rights, he has chosen not to exercise
them).
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of two parents at the time of birth.”99 Working from this premise, the court cited
to a case in which a divorcing couple’s separation agreement contained
provisions terminating the husband’s parental rights to the marital child.100 The
E.E. court stated that parties cannot contract to terminate parental rights, and
that “a child’s relationship with his or her parents is so significant that all doubts
are to be resolved against the destruction of that relationship.”101 However, the
application of this principle to the situation between E.E. and O.M.G.R. is
inappropriate. There is a stark distinction between a husband who attempts to
shirk his parental obligations towards a child he intended to parent, and a sperm
donor relinquishing parental rights to a child he never intended to parent.
Furthermore, the court made clear that biology is determinative of
parentage except in the case of artificial insemination where parties strictly
comply with the licensed physician requirement.102 The court stated:
Although this court can see by the parties’ original agreement that the intent was
to have defendant’s role limited to supplying biological material and for
defendant to be absolved from further liability, the parties failed to abide by the
statute in failing to use a physician . . . . Accordingly, this court is bound to
follow the language of the statute and may not ignore a portion of the statue
because of the parties’ intent.103

Here, the court declared O.M.G.R. a legal parent, despite expressly
acknowledging that the parties’ intentions were contrary to the court’s decision.
The court ultimately granted sole custody to E.E. and did not order O.M.G.R. to
pay child support because E.E. was not seeking any.104 However, the court did
not terminate O.M.G.R.’s parental rights and implied that this result was suitable
so long as O.M.G.R. refrained from exercising his parental rights.105 This
suggests that if, at a later date, O.M.G.R. chose to exercise his parental rights, the
outcome might be different.106 Thus, the court left E.E.’s parental rights
vulnerable to subsequent challenge from O.M.G.R.
The court’s decision in E.E. is problematic for several reasons. To begin
with, the court seems pegged between two policy decisions, and as such, reaches
a conclusion that is not entirely sound. The court strictly adheres to the licensed
physician requirement and finds that O.M.G.R. is the legal parent, yet the court

99. Id. at 286 (citing C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 167 (N.J. Super. Ct. Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct.
1977). Note that C.M. v. C.C. is a 1977 case in which a woman conceived of a child by selfinsemination of sperm from a known donor, a man she had had a prior dating relationship with. In
that case, the court stated, “if an unmarried woman conceives a child through artificial insemination
from semen from a known man, that man cannot be considered to be less a father because he is not
married to the woman.” C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. at 167.
100. Id. at 287 (citing R.H. v. M.K., 254 N.J. Super. 480 (Ch. Div. 1991)).
101. Id. at 287-88.
102. See id. at 288-89.
103. Id. at 292–93.
104. Id. at 293.
105. See id. (“[O.M.G.R.] . . . has made the choice not to exercise his parental rights and, should
that continue by agreement between the parties, the court sees no reason to impose a different
result.”).
106. See id. (“The court expresses no opinion as to the appropriateness of the termination of
defendant’s parental rights at a later date.”).
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does not hold him accountable for child support.107 This decision seeks to
uphold the policy that every child should have two parents and that a parent
cannot contract away support. However, the court’s decision does not actually
enforce this policy because even though O.M.G.R. is a legal parent, he has no
obligations. Here, the court’s decision would have been more favorable had it
either enforced the parties’ written agreement and honored their intentions, or,
in adherence to the licensed physician requirement, found O.M.G.R. the legal
parent, and enforced its policy concerns by ordering O.M.G.R. to pay child
support.
In addition, although the practical effects of the court’s ruling enforced the
parties’ intentions, the holding creates ambiguity. For instance, what would
happen if years went by and O.M.G.R. decided to exercise his parental rights or
if E.E. decided she did want child support from O.M.G.R? What would happen if
O.M.G.R. did not exercise his parental rights and E.E. sought a termination of his
parental rights or wanted a partner to adopt her child? This open-ended result
demonstrates why an intent-based approach memorialized in a written
document is desirable. Binding both parties to the intent manifested in a preinsemination written agreement creates certainty and closure. It protects a donor
seeking to relinquish parental rights from the chance that he will one day be
forced to pay child support, while reassuring the recipient-mother that a donor
cannot assert parental rights against her child. By the same token, an intentbased model legitimizes and protects any relationship between a donor and the
child that was agreed to by both the mother and donor. The disconcerting
takeaway from E.E. is that the parties did enter into a seemingly valid preinsemination agreement, yet the court failed to enforce it.
In sum, statutes with licensed physician requirements create problematic
results for sperm donors and recipient-mothers. While the policy rationales
behind licensed physician requirements are important, pre-insemination written
agreements can serve the same function as physician involvement. As the court
stated in Jhordan C., physician involvement allows a doctor to obtain the medical
history of the donor, while simultaneously serving an evidentiary purpose, and
creating a formal structure to the donor-recipient relationship in case a dispute
arises.108
There are several reasons why a physician is not required to satisfy either of
these concerns. First, one of the reasons women choose known sperm donors is
because they have easy access to their medical history.109 If a woman does not
know the medical history of her known donor, she can easily ask him.
Moreover, even if a woman obtains sperm from a sperm bank and conducts a
self-insemination, she does not need a physician to obtain the medical history of
the donor. This is because sperm banks screen their donors and do not accept or
distribute sperm that may contain infectious diseases.110 Thus, physician

107. See id. at 292–93.
108. Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386, 393 (1986).
109. See Lezin, supra note 6, at 208 n.132.
110. See Donor Screening, FAIRFAX CRYOBANK, http://www.fairfaxcryobank.com/
donorscreen.shtml (last visited Oct. 6, 2013) (explaining that this sperm bank (1) requires each
applicant to have a physical exam and have their genetic and medical history evaluated by a clinical
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involvement in the insemination process does not serve a unique purpose and its
function can be easily accomplished through simple inquiry or routine screening
at a sperm bank.
Second, a physician is not required for evidentiary purposes or to create a
“formal, documented structure”111 when a written contract can serve this exact
function. A pre-insemination agreement entered into by the donor and mother
with terms specifying the donor’s rights and obligations preserves the parties’
intentions in a binding contract that is enforceable in a court of law. This
contract provides the same degree of formality as physician involvement and
acts as a tool judges can consult when disputes arise between the donor and
mother. 112 Hence, the purpose behind licensed physician requirements can still
be achieved through other means. The next section discusses donor paternity
statutes that provide for written agreements.
B. Written Agreement Opt-Out Statutes
Several states have written agreement, opt-out statutes which are more
favorable to determining the rights of known donors and recipient-mothers
based on their intent. These statutes allow donors and recipient-mothers to
retain parental rights by opting-out of the default donor paternity bar in a
written agreement. While these statutes focus on donor retention of full parental
rights, I argue that written contracts should also be used in situations where
donors relinquish all parental rights or contract for visitation.
Despite its unfavorable licensed physician requirement, California’s donor
paternity statute is one example of a written agreement, opt-out statute:
The donor of semen provided to a licensed physician . . . for use in artificial
insemination . . . of a woman other than the donor’s wife is treated in law as if he
were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived, unless otherwise agreed to
in a writing signed by the donor and the woman prior to the conception of the child.113

Other states like New Jersey, Kansas, and New Hampshire have also
adopted similar statutes that provide a mechanism for known sperm donors to
enter into private agreements with recipient-mothers preserving their parental
rights.114
Written agreement, opt-out statutes are favorable in determining parentage

geneticist and (2) tests donor for infectious diseases and then retests six months after the sperm is
donated and quarantined for HIV, hepatitis, syphilis, gonorrhea, and Chlamydia.); see also What Does
Sperm Donation Involve?, http://www.stanford.edu/class/siw198q/websites/reprotech/
New%20Ways%20of%20Making%20Babies/spermint.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2013) (detailing the
process for screening of sperm donors, noting that only 5% of all applicants who apply to donate
sperm meet the criteria and that applicants go through a “rigorous” screening process before they
may donate, including a blood screening, genetic screening, specimen screening, and physical
analysis.).
111. See Jhordan C., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386 at 393.
112. See infra Section VII for a more specific discussion of what parties should include in a preinsemination contract.
113. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b) (emphasis added).
114. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West 2013); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2208 (West 2012); N.H. REV.
STAT. 168-B: 3 (West 2013).
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because they protect and honor the parties’ intentions. The parties’ intentions
include their carefully thought out future plans, including the best interests of
the child,115 and their desire for a clear written agreement which allows them to
predict how the contract will be enforced in case of a dispute.116 In Professor
Marjorie Maguire Shultz’s view, “legal rules governing modern procreative
arrangements and parental status should recognize the importance and the
legitimacy of individual efforts to project intentions and decisions into the
future.”117 Professor Shultz explains that the actions between the parties in ART
are deliberative, explicit, and bargained-for by the nature of ART.118 Choosing
ART requires “planning . . . time, effort, emotion and money expended; and the
involvement of non-intimates [such as] professionals and reproductive
participants.”119 Shultz explains that the parties in an ART agreement are “nonintimates” who place great need on formal dispute resolution since they have
serious expectations and rely on the arrangement with the other party.120 In this
way, ART is different from procreation achieved through sexual intercourse,
which does not usually involve the same degree of preparation as ART and
presumes intent between the two sexual partners.121 Thus, where the parties’
intentions are manifested in such a deliberative, explicit, and bargained-for way
and “where they are the catalyst for reliance and expectations,” such intentions
should be honored.122 Courts should defer to and uphold such an agreement
memorialized in writing because it is clear that the parties contemplated an
arrangement that reflects their needs and wishes.
In addition, private contracts create predictability, clarity, enforceability,
and formality.123 Predictability is particularly important because it brings finality

115. See Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An
Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 326 n.80 (1990) (“[A] child’s bests interests
will, in many an ordinary case, be best served by effectuating the deliberate intentions of his
parents.”); see also Hill, supra note 28, at 356 n.12 (explaining that a requirement to be an intended
parent is to gain the “constructive consent of the child.”).
116. See Shultz, supra note 115, at 324 (noting that “[w]here artificial or assisted reproductive
techniques are used, the need to reduce uncertainty, to project decisions into the future, and to
protect reciprocal expectations and reliance is especially significant.”).
117. See id. at 302.
118. Id. at 324.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See id. (noting that coital partners are given parental status in part because of their presumed
intention, whereas in ART this may be more difficult to discern). It should be noted that although
ART requires advanced planning, conception through sexual intercourse can also involve advanced
planning, timing, and involvement of physicians in cases where couples have difficulty conceiving
naturally. However, ART and sexual intercourse are still distinguishable when it comes to intent,
since conception through ART may or may not involve genetic material from an individual without
parental intent, whereas in sexual intercourse, it is presumed that both parties intend to parent the
child by virtue of their act.
122. Id. at 302-03.
123. See In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025, 1039 (Kan. 2007) (“[R]equirement that any such agreement
be in writing enhances predictability, clarity, and enforceability.”); see also McDonald, supra note 10,
at 343 (quoting this language in KMH to demonstrate why written agreements in the ART context are
favorable).

Garcia Proof 1 (Do Not Delete)

212 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

2/18/2014 11:29 AM

Volume 21:197 2013

and closure to the parenting agreement.124 A written agreement puts both the
known donor and recipient on notice about future custody or child support
battles. Under an opt-out provision, a donor who has not entered into a written
agreement is foreclosed from bringing a paternity claim while the recipientmother is foreclosed from seeking child support.125 Similarly, if there is a written
agreement, the parties know that the terms of their arrangement are
memorialized in writing and what those terms are. A written agreement makes
those terms easier to enforce if a dispute should arise.
In addition, a written agreement adds an element of formality to the
arrangement between the known donor and the recipient-mother.126 This air of
legitimacy may also encourage the parties to carefully consider the terms of their
agreement and the gravity of knowing that they are creating a legal document
enforceable in court.127 Also, written agreements serve as tools for pre-emptive
conflict resolution.128 In entering into an agreement, the donor and recipientmother are compelled to contemplate the best care arrangements and
responsibilities of each parent. Thus, private ordering allows parties to
anticipate any conflicts or misunderstandings they might have and work them
out before the child is conceived or born.
Lastly, written agreement provisions contemplate and, in turn, protect the
best interests of the child. These statutes bar known donors from acquiring any
parental rights to a child merely by helping the recipient-mother conceive.
Instead, they must execute a written agreement. In this way, the statute makes
clear that the sole donation of genetic material does not make a donor a legal
father.129 The written agreement provision places the intent to be a parent at the
core of gaining legal rights. This serves the best interests of the child because it
“diminish[es] importance on genetic or biological connection and looks instead
to established caregiving or clearly established parenting intention as essential,
or at least co-equal, determinants of parentage.”130 Using intent to parent and
provide for a child as a primary factor in determining parentage is not only
intuitive, but creates a greater likelihood that a child will grow up in a nurturing
and caring home.
Statutes that contain written agreement, opt-out provisions protect the
rights of known sperm donors and recipient-mothers by preserving their intent,
ensuring predictability, clarity, and enforceability. However, it should be noted

124. See K.M.H., 169 P.3d at 1039.
125. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b).
126. See In re Paternity of M.F., 938 N.E.2d 1256, 1259 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that an
agreement between a known donor and recipient-mother was enforceable in part because it had the
formalities of a legitimate legal contract).
127. See id. at 1261 (explaining that the formal contract in this case reflected the parties’ “careful
consideration of the implications of such an agreement and a thorough understanding of its meaning
and import.”).
128. See K.M.H., 169 P.3d at 1039 (stating that the written agreement provision under discussion
is meant to encourage early resolution of parental rights).
129. See id. at 1041 (“If . . . [a] genetic relationship must be destiny, then an anonymous donor
with no intention to be a father would nevertheless automatically become one.”). LS Rule 10.6.
130. David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of Transition: Tensions Between Legal, Biological, and
Social Conceptions of Parenthood, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 125, 136 (2006).
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that these written agreement statutes are not broad enough to encompass the
variety of arrangements that known donors and recipient-mothers may wish to
create. The typical written agreement provision only applies to situations where
the known donor seeks to be a legal parent but does not apply to situations
where the parties agree that the known donor relinquishes all parental rights, or
contracts for limited rights such as visitation. Later in this note, I propose that
written agreements should be required by law for all such arrangements,
including full parental rights, no parental rights, or visitation rights.
V. KNOWN DONORS RELINQUISHING PARENTAL RIGHTS: THE PUBLIC POLICY
CONCERNS
As with written agreements to retain parental rights, courts should enforce
agreements in which a known donor relinquishes parental rights and
responsibilities, so long as they do not violate public policy. Where agreements
satisfy public policy, intent should be the guiding factor in determining known
donor’s rights and obligations.
In Ferguson v. McKiernan, a 2007 case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
analyzed the public policy implications of agreements in which a known donor
relinquishes full parental rights.131 There, a known donor provided sperm to the
recipient-mother, a former romantic partner.132 The recipient-mother preferred
the known donor to an anonymous donor because “‘[s]he knew [his]
background. . . [and] makeup, and just said that she preferred to have that
anonymous donor known to her.’”133 Although the recipient-mother knew the
donor, the terms of the oral agreement were constructed to mirror an anonymous
sperm donation.134 The insemination was to take place in a clinical setting, the
donor’s role would be confidential, the donor would not seek visitation or
custody, and the recipient-mother would not demand financial or emotional
support.135 Accordingly, the donor did not assist the recipient-mother with prenatal or post-natal care, nor was he listed on the twins’ birth certificate.136 Five
years went by without any deviation from the parties’ agreement.137 During
those five years, the donor and mother lost contact.138 The donor moved to
another town, married, and fathered his own child.139 Then, the recipient-mother
unexpectedly filed for child support against the donor.140
The trial court found that the parties had a binding oral agreement, but that
“‘a parent cannot bind a child or bargain away that child’s right to support’” and
therefore the agreement was unenforceable against public policy.141

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

See Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1236, 1244-45 (Pa. 2007).
Id. at 1238.
Id. at 1239 n.4.
Id. at 1238.
Id.
Id. at 1240–41.
Id.
Id. at 1240.
Id. at 1241.
See id. at 1240.
Id. at 1241. (The trial court stated, “[T]his Court cannot ignore and callously disregard the
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Accordingly, the donor was declared the twins’ legal father and ordered to pay
$1,384 per month and $66,033.66 in arrearages due immediately.142 Interestingly,
the trial court found “ample evidence” of the donor’s intention to surrender his
rights and responsibilities to the child and, moreover, that the recipient-mother’s
testimony “contained numerous inconsistencies and contradictions . . .
intentional falsehoods, fraud, and deceit.”143 However, the court ignored the
mother’s deceptive conduct and the parties’ agreement in favor of providing the
twins with a legal father and additional means of financial support.144 The
Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s decision on the same grounds.145
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the parties’
agreement was enforceable and reversed the lower court’s child support order.146
The Supreme Court applied the following definition of public policy:
Only dominant public policy would justify such action [of invalidating a
contract]. In the absence of a plain indication of that policy through long
governmental practice or statutory enactments, or of violations of obvious ethical
or moral standards, the Court should not assume to declare contracts . . .
contrary to public policy. The courts must be content to await legislative
action.147

In its reasoning, the court noted the prevalence of ART and the use of
written ART agreements in contemporary society.148 The court also noted a
“growing consensus” that institutional sperm donation does not automatically
give rights or obligations to a sperm donor.149 In addition, the court looked to
the absence of a legislative mandate as an indication that there was no strong
public policy against donor’s relinquishing their parental rights.150 The court
then equated the known donor in this case to an anonymous donor by finding

interests of the unheard-from third party[,] a party who without their privity to this contract renders
it void.”).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See Ferguson, 940 A.2d at 1241.; see also supra Section III(A) and accompanying discussion
about the policy concerns in E.E. v. O.M.G.R.
145. See Ferguson, 940 A.2d at 1241. Note that Pennsylvania has not enacted either the 1973 or
2002 UPA and did not reach its decision in Ferguson at the lower court, superior court, or supreme
court level by construing either UPA or any Pennsylvania donor paternity statute.
146. Id. at 1248.
147. Id. at 1245 n. 16.
148. See id. at 1245 (noting that “all manner of arrangements involving the donation of sperm or
eggs abound in contemporary society” and that “[a]n increasing number of would-be mothers . . . are
turning to donor arrangements.”)
149. See id. at 1246. Note that the court refers to anonymous sperm donations via sperm bank as
“clinical, institutional” sperm donations. Hence, it is unclear whether the court requires a clinical
setting and physician involvement in order for relinquishment of anonymous sperm donor’s parental
rights to satisfy public policy. In any case, the court’s analysis suggests that when a known donor
functions as an anonymous donor in other respects like maintaining anonymity and taking sexual
intercourse out of the equation, a known donor’s relinquishment of parental rights does not violate
public policy.
150. See id. at 1248 (noting that “The absence of a legislative mandate . . . illustrate[s] the very
opposite of unanimity with regard to the legal relationships arising from sperm donation, whether
anonymous or otherwise.”).
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that the parties negotiated an agreement outside a romantic relationship, agreed
to the terms, eliminated sexual intercourse as a factor by performing the ART
procedure in a clinical setting, attempted to conceal the known donor’s paternity,
and adhered to the agreement for five years.151 The court then noted that
anonymous donors routinely enter into contracts with sperm banks relinquishing
their parental rights.152 Therefore, because the agreement in this case did not
violate a “dominant public policy” or “obvious ethical or moral standards,” it
was not void against public policy and the agreement was enforceable.153 In
addition, the Supreme Court’s analysis focused on the parties’ intentions. It
wrote: “The facts of this case . . . reveal the parties’ mutual intention to preserve
all of the trappings of a conventional sperm donation, including formation of a
binding agreement.”154
Moreover, the decision in Ferguson acknowledged the appropriate weight
that should be given to the interests of known donors and children conceived by
ART. The court noted:
This Court takes very seriously the best interests of the children of this
Commonwealth, and we recognize that to rule in favor of Sperm Donor in this
case denies a source of support to two children who did not ask to be born into
this situation. Absent the parties’ agreement, however, the twins would not have
been born at all, or would have been born to a different and anonymous sperm
donor, who neither party disputes would be safe from a support order.155

Here the court appropriately acknowledged the best interests of the
children. However, the court recognized that it must also weigh the donor’s
interests and the parties’ intentions. In so doing, the court reached the right
result and reversed the child support order.
Ferguson makes clear that when known donors act like anonymous donors
and have no intention to parent a child, they do not violate public policy in
relinquishing their parental rights.156 While the court in Ferguson reached the
right outcome, not all agreements in which known donors relinquish parental
rights should be enforced. For instance, in Mintz v. Zoernig, a recipient-mother
and her partner asked a known donor if he would donate sperm and “serve as a
male role model” for their child by establishing visitation rights.157 The couple
would be the primary parents and the donor would have no financial

151. Id. at 1246-47.
152. See id. at 1246.
153. See id. at 1248.
154. Id. at 1246.
155. Id. at 1248.
156. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also noted another policy rationale against a point-blank
distinction between known and anonymous donor’s ability to relinquish parental rights and
responsibilities. The court stated, “[T]o protect herself and the sperm donor, that would-be mother
would have no choice but to resort to anonymous donation or abandon her desire to be a biological
mother, notwithstanding her considered personal preference to conceive using the sperm of someone
familiar, whose background, traits, and medical history are not shrouded in mystery. To much the
same end, where a would-be donor cannot trust that he is safe from a future support action, he will
be considerably less likely to provide his sperm to a friend or acquaintance who asks, significantly
limiting a would-be mother’s reproductive prerogatives.” Id. at 1247.
157. Mintz v. Zoernig, 198 P.3d 861, 862 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008).
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responsibilities to the child.158 The recipient-mother conducted an at-home
insemination and gave birth to a child.159 The donor and couple put their
agreement in writing after the child’s birth.160 Shortly thereafter, the couple
ended their relationship.161 The mother then asked the donor if he would agree
to provide sperm for another insemination under the same terms of the first
agreement.162 The donor agreed and another child was born.163 In light of the
agreement, the donor had significant contact with the two children, although the
recipient-mother acted as the primary parent.164 Shortly thereafter, the mother
filed a paternity action against the donor seeking child support.165 The parties
entered into a stipulated order approved by the court in which the donor agreed
to pay child support.166 On appeal from a motion for modification of child
support, the donor challenged his obligation to pay child support, even though
he was current on his payments, and asserted that he was only a mere sperm
donor.167
At the time Mintz was decided, New Mexico had a statute in place that
allowed for a donor to be a legal parent if a licensed physician requirement was
met and the parties signed a written agreement in which the donor consented.168
Because the recipient-mother self-inseminated without physician assistance, the
court found that the donor was not a legal parent pursuant to that statute.169
However, under a different provision in New Mexico’s UPA, the known donor
was a presumed father because he held himself out as the children’s father,
established a relationship with them, had regular visitation with them since
birth, filed a motion alleging that the mother interfered with his relationship with
the children by imposing conditions on visitation, acknowledged in the
stipulated order that he was the natural father, and was registered as both
children’s father with the vital statistics bureau.170 Thus, the Court of Appeals
found that the donor was “enjoy[ing] the rights of parenthood” and was
therefore the children’s legal father.171 The court noted that since the law
“‘reflects a strong public policy in favor of support,’” the agreement

158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. Note that the specific language and more precise terms of the written agreement were
not included in the court’s opinion.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 862.
166. Id. at 862-63.
167. Id. at 863.
168. Mintz, 198 P.3d at 863. Note that in 2009, subsequent to the Mintz decision, New Mexico
amended its Uniform Parentage Act, which now borrows more closely from the 2002 UPA and no
longer requires physician involvement in artificial insemination. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-11A-101
to -903 (West 2012).
169. See Mintz, 198 P.3d at 863 (noting that “[i]n this case, the sperm was not provided to a
licensed physician, but rather, Mother inseminated herself. As a result, the artificial insemination
section of the UPA is not applicable to our facts.”).
170. Id. at 863-64.
171. Id. at 864.
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relinquishing parental rights was unenforceable and the child support order was
upheld.172
In Mintz, assuming that the known donor really was enjoying the full rights
of legal parenthood, the court’s decision seems right. Mintz is distinguishable
from Ferguson because the known donor in Mintz relinquished his parental rights
but still acted as a legal father.173 Thus, the agreement in Mintz violated public
policy because the children’s father reaped the benefits of legal parenthood while
shirking the financial obligations.174 In a situation like Mintz, even if the donor
relinquishes his parental rights in a written agreement, the court should find the
agreement unenforceable as it would violate public policy.175
In addition, Mintz demonstrates the difference between a known donorchild relationship maintained through visitation rights and a known donor-child
relationship in which the donor is actually parenting. If the donor is actually
parenting the child, he should be given parental rights and his parental
obligations should be enforced, despite an earlier agreement to the contrary.176
To this point, Mintz raises the issue of changed circumstances in insemination
agreements—an issue that will be mentioned in Section VII of this note.
Moreover, certain factors may aid a court in considering whether an
agreement relinquishing a donor of parental rights should be enforced. First, the
court should not solely apply a best interest of the child standard.177 This is
because this standard will always weigh in favor of compelling the donor to
provide support.178 Surely a child benefits more from two sources of financial
support than just one. Thus, if a court can conclusively find that the recipientmother and the donor agreed that the donor relinquish financial support, the
court should enforce the agreement.179
Another factor the court should consider is whether the parties were

172. Id. (quoting In re Estate of DeLara, 38 P.3d 198, 201 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001)). Note also that the
court doesn’t mention at all that the first child was born with the intent that the recipient-mother’s exlesbian partner would parent the child. It is beyond the scope of this article but worth wondering
whether the court should have gone after the former partner for child support for the first child. It is
also interesting to consider this in light of the issues surrounding gay marriage and the implications
for children born to gay couples who are not legally recognized as married or having the same
obligations of a heterosexual couple. See id. at 862 (noting that both of “the women would be primary
parents.”).
173. Id. at 862.
174. Note that the known donor in Mintz was current on child support once the lower court
ordered it. However, on appeal to the New Mexico Court of Appeals he challenged his obligation to
pay child support. Id. at 862-63.
175. Note that this assumes that Mintz was really acting as a legal parent to the children. If he
was a known donor with visitation rights, then he probably should not have been awarded full
parental rights and the court should have enforced the visitation agreement, unless it was the parties’
intent that the donor have full parental rights.
176. Note that finding that the donor is a legal parent and enforcing his responsibilities pursuant
to that relationship are both within the best interests of the child because the child will benefit from
his caretaker having legal authority to make decisions on his behalf.
177. M. Scott Serfozo, Sperm Donor Child Support Obligations: How Courts and Legislatures Should
Properly Weigh the Interests of the Donor, Donee, and Child, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 715, 734 (2008).
178. Id.
179. See id.
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involved in a romantic relationship at the time the agreement was made.180 The
underlying idea is that a donor romantically involved with the recipient-mother
more likely intends to parent the child than a non-intimate donor who may be
making a “true” donation with no strings attached.181 A third factor to consider
is the timing in which the recipient-mother files suit for child support.182 The
more time that passes between the date that the agreement was entered into and
the date that the recipient-mother brings suit, the greater the likelihood that the
parties did not intend for the donor to be a parent to the child.183
In evaluating whether agreements by known donors to relinquish parental
rights violate public policy, a court should conduct a fact-specific inquiry into
both the parties’ intentions and the current relationship between the known
donor and the child. If the known donor is not actually parenting while shirking
his financial obligations, the agreement likely comports with public policy.
The next section discusses the constitutional barriers that known donors
seeking parental or visitation rights may face, even with a binding written
agreement.
VI. TROXEL V. GRANVILLE: CONSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS TO KNOWN DONORS’ RIGHTS
Often, known donors who develop a relationship with the child they help
conceive find themselves in a situation where the recipient-mother severs the
donor’s relationship with the child. This may be problematic in cases where
there is a written agreement awarding the known donor visitation.184 Despite the
written agreement, the Supreme Court’s decision in Troxel v. Granville may be a
barrier to known donors who seek to enforce such agreements and receive
visitation rights.
In Troxel v. Granville, the Supreme Court struck down a Washington
visitation statute, which permitted “‘[a]ny person’” at “‘any time’” to “petition a
superior court for visitation rights . . . and authorize[d] that court to grant such
visitation rights whenever ‘visitation may serve the best interest of the child.’”185
The Supreme Court held Washington’s third-party visitation statute
unconstitutional as applied because it did not give deference to the children’s
legal parent, their mother, before awarding visitation to their grandparents.186

180. Id. at 734–35.
181. Id. at 735.
182. Id.
183. Serfozo, supra note 177, at 735. For instance, in Ferguson, five years went by before the
mother sought child support from the known donor and the court found her testimony riddled with
fraudulent allegations. See Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1236, 1240 (Pa. 2007).
184. Note that in my research I did not find a case on point in which a known donor came into
court with a written agreement and the Troxel problem arose. Rather, the most common cases
construing Troxel involve grandparents and ex-lesbian partners seeking visitation. However, this
issue would arise for known donors if they sought visitation through a state’s third-party visitation
statute or if they sought to have a written agreement enforced and courts determined that Troxel is a
barrier to enforcing such an agreement.
185. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 60 (2000) (quoting WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §26.10.160(3)
(West 2000)).
186. See id. at 67 (“Once the visitation petition has been filed in court and the matter is placed
before a judge, a parent’s decision that visitation would not be in the child’s best interest is accorded
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Therefore, the statute infringed on the mother’s fundamental parental rights to
direct the care, custody, and control of her child.187 Thus, in Troxel, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed a parent’s fundamental right, superseding all other people, to
direct the upbringing of his or her children.
After Troxel, the question emerged as to whether a third-party could
successfully petition for visitation with a child against a fit parent. The
underlying rationale for awarding third-party visitation is to safeguard the
relationship between a child and a non-legal parent who has formed a
meaningful and legitimate relationship with the child.188 Thus, when known
donors come into court seeking visitation with a child whom they helped
procreate and with whom they have an established relationship, courts should
give weight to written visitation agreements between the known donor and the
recipient-mother. This approach does not offend the Court’s ruling in Troxel.
In the case of a known donor who made a pre-existing written agreement
with a recipient-mother for visitation rights with her child, the legally binding
agreement actually defers to the recipient-mother, assuming the contract is
enforceable. Thus, it does not violate Troxel for a court to equally weigh the rights
of the known donor and the recipient-mother when the mother authorized the
donor to share some of her parental rights with her child in a formal and binding
legal document. If a mother wishes to retain full protection of her parental
rights, she “cannot cede over to [a] third party parental authority of the exercise
of which may create a profound bond with the child.”189 Therefore, if a known
donor and mother entered into a written visitation agreement, the donor should
have a right to be heard.
As a back-up option to having the written agreement enforced, a donor
petitioning a court in a state with a third-party visitation statute should seek
visitation through such a statute. After Troxel, third-party visitation statues are
not per se unconstitutional, nor are a fit parent’s decisions immune from judicial
review.190
For example, Delaware’s third-party visitation statute is a
constitutionally permissible mechanism that known donors with an established
relationship to a child could use to obtain visitation rights.191 Delaware’s thirdparty visitation statute provides:
(a) Prior to granting a third-party visitation order, the Court shall find . . .
(1) Third party visitation is in the child’s best interests; and
(2) One of the following as to each parent:

no deference.”).
187. Id. at 57.
188. See id. at 98 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (focusing on applying the best interests of the child
standard in third-party visitation cases and protecting legitimate and established relationships
between a child and third party).
189. V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 552 (N.J. 2000) (reasoning that when a legal parent authorizes a
third-party, non-legal parent to act as a parent for her child, the legal parent no longer maintains a
zone of privacy with herself and her child in the context of a de facto parentage action).
190. Fenn v. Sheriff, 109 Cal. App. 4th 1466 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that a third-party
grandparent visitation statute was constitutional).
191. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 13, § 2412 (West 2013).

Garcia Proof 1 (Do Not Delete)

220 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

2/18/2014 11:29 AM

Volume 21:197 2013

(a) The parent consents to the third-party visitation;
(b) The child is dependent, neglected, or abused in the parent’s care;
(c) The parent is deceased; or
(d) The parent objects to the visitation; however, the petitioner has demonstrated,
by clear and convincing evidence, that the objection is unreasonable; and has
demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the visitation will not
substantially interfere with the parent/child relationship.192

Although, in the event the legal parent refuses to agree to third-party
visitation, the petitioner must meet the high evidentiary burden of clear and
convincing evidence, Delaware’s statute is favorable towards known donors.
The statute includes the best interests of the child standard, which inherently
considers the relationship between the donor and the child, and presumes that
the stronger the relationship between the donor and the child, the more likely an
award of visitation will be in the best interests of the child.193
A third-party visitation statute that balances the rights and interests of a
legal parent, the best interests of the child, and the donor would be a successful
one.194 For instance, the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund and Gay
and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders developed the following standing
requirement for third-parties bringing visitation petitions: A petitioner must
show:
(1) [T]he curtailment of a significant relationship with the children of a quality
and depth that sets petitioner[] apart from the many people, even blood relatives,
with whom children have positive, loving relationships, coupled with (2) a
showing of prior parental knowledge and fostering of the relationship that
allowed it to grow in importance to a child.195

Only after clearing this standing requirement will the court proceed and
apply a best interest of the child standard.196 The first prong accounts for the
donor’s interest in his established relationship with the child, the second prong
protects the legal parent’s rights because it requires consent to the donor-child
relationship, and the best interests of the child standard protects the welfare of
the child. A statutory scheme that balances these three interests is a favorable
one.
A written agreement between the known donor and recipient-mother may
persuade a court to allow a donor to petition for visitation, and to view that
petition on equal footing with the mother’s position, despite Troxel. In addition,
third-party visitation statutes that balance the interests of the known donor, the
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See Sally Goldfarb, Visitation for Nonparents after Troxel v. Granville: Where Should States Draw
the Line? 32 RUTGERS L.J. 783, 800 (2001) (“[O]nce a parent has decided to allow someone to share the
parental role . . . the interests of both the child and the nonparent in maintaining the significant bond
between them . . . warrant granting standing to the nonparent to seek a visitation order.”).
195. Brief of Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund & Gay & Lesbian Advocates &
Defenders as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 7, Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (No.
99-138).
196. Id. at 8.
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legal parent, and the child could result in successful visitation claims
VII. PROPOSAL: WHAT SHOULD A WRITTEN AGREEMENT LOOK LIKE?
This note has demonstrated that certain state laws and court decisions
regulating ART are problematic because they do not apply an intent-based
approach to determinations of a donor’s rights. I propose that the best
mechanism for honoring the intent of the known donors and recipient-mother is
a written agreement that sets out the rights and expectations of the parties. An
agreement where the parties decide the donor will relinquish full parental rights,
retain full parental rights, or have continued involvement with the child in the
form of visitation rights, should all be in writing.
First, state laws should require that written agreements be entered into prior
to the child’s conception; that is, before the insemination takes place. The
purpose of this requirement is to ensure that both parties enter into the
agreement at a time when they have equal bargaining power.197 The agreement
should look like an arm’s length transaction, where the agreement is entered into
voluntarily, i.e. without compulsion or duress, and the parties act in their own
self-interest.198 An agreement should be the result of fair dealing, which includes
real negotiations between the parties and the ability to choose.199 Requiring the
known donor and recipient-mother to enter into the agreement prior to the
insemination is an attempt to ensure equal bargaining and encourage the
drafting of a fair and honest agreement. In addition, entering into the agreement
prior to insemination encourages early resolution of conflicts and an early
determination of each party’s rights.200 Therefore, I propose that known donors
and recipient-mothers be required by law to enter into an agreement prior to
insemination.
Second, the written agreement must “reflect the parties’ careful
consideration of the implications of such an agreement and a thorough
understanding of its meaning and import.”201 One way this may be
demonstrated is through the formality of the agreement. The written agreement
construed in In re Paternity of M.F. is an example of the formalities and
comprehensiveness of a pre-insemination agreement. In Paternity of M.F., the
known donor waived all rights to custody or visitation with the child and the
mother waived all rights to child support and financial assistance from the
donor.202
The court enforced the agreement in part because it was a
197. See In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025, 1039 (Kan. 2007) (commenting on Kansas’ written agreement
opt-out provision: “the design of the statute implicitly encourages early resolution of . . . whether a
donor will have parental rights . . . the parties must decide whether they will enter into a written
agreement before any donation is made, while there is still balanced bargaining power on both sides
of the parenting equation.”).
198. See Walters v. Knox Cnty. Bd. of Revision, 546 N.E.2d 932, 933 (Ohio 1989) (listing the
elements of an arms’ length transaction).
199. See Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 51 Cal. App. 4th 1519, 1519, 1533-34 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)
(stating that contracts may be unconscionable when there is an inequality of bargaining power
between the parties).
200. See K.M.H., 169 P.3d at 1039.
201. In re Paternity of M.F., 938 N.E.2d 1256, 1261 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
202. Id. at 1257.
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comprehensive and formal contract.203 The document was six pages and twentyfour paragraphs; it had been prepared by an attorney, as so stated in the
agreement and included provisions regarding the acknowledgement of rights
and obligations, waiver, consent to adopt, mediation and arbitration, amending
the agreement, a four-corners clause, and a choice of law provision.204 The
parties also included a clause entitled “Legal Construction,” which provided that
each party understood that legal questions could arise from the issues in the
agreement which had not been settled by statute or court decisions, but
nonetheless entered into the agreement with “the intent and desire that it be fully
enforceable . . . and to document their intent at the time the child was
conceived.”205 The court went on to state that it was hesitant to set out formal
requirements for the form and content of all ART contracts but reiterated that the
agreement should reflect the careful consideration of the parties.206 The court did
note, however, that it “[did] not mean to sanction the view that a writing
consisting of a few lines scribbled on the back of a scrap of paper found lying
about will suffice in this kind of case.”207
Thus, the formality and
comprehensiveness of the written agreement in Paternity of M.F. is a good
paradigm for a contract between a known donor and recipient-mother.
Third, aside from the written agreement’s formalness and legal provisions,
it should contain certain provisions and terms that are detailed enough to be
useful in the event of a dispute. This will vary depending on the party’s
arrangement. For instance, an agreement in which a known donor intends to
relinquish full parental rights, including custody and visitation, and the
recipient-mother intends to waive her rights to child support and financial
assistance will be sufficiently detailed if it essentially states just that. The
contract in Paternity of M.F. is a good example of this. The contract read:
Mother hereby waives all rights to child support and financial assistance from
Donor, including assistance with medical and hospital expenses incurred as a
result of her pregnancy and delivery . . . . It is expressly agreed that Mother will
be solely responsible for the financial support of the child. . . . Donor hereby
waives all rights to custody of or visitation with such child and releases Mother
from any and all claims for visitation and covenants and that he will not
demand, request or compel any guardianship, custody or visitation rights with
any such child.208

This provision is sufficiently detailed and should be encouraged. However,
a simpler agreement stating that the donor relinquishes parental rights and the
mother waives the right to child support could be sufficiently adequate as well.

203. Id. at 1261-62.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1262.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1261.
208. Id. at 1257 (The agreement goes on to state that the mother will be responsible for all “legal,
financial, child-rearing and medical needs of such child without any involvement by or demands of
authority from Donor, and Donor expressly agrees that Mother shall have sole physical and legal
custody of such child and that Mother’s custody of such child is in the child’s best interest.” Id. at
1258.).
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By contrast, an agreement where the known donor retains either full
parental rights or visitation rights should be much more detailed since such an
arrangement allocates caretaking to each party. In these cases, the agreement
should adhere more closely to child custody agreements and comport with state
law. The difficulty with this approach is that state child custody laws assume
that a child already exists, which makes it easier for the parties to make an
agreement based on their daily routines. Still, an agreement between a known
donor and recipient-mother should specify if the arrangement is for sole or joint
custody, and include the residential and decision-making arrangements for the
child.209 The agreement can also list the areas over which one or both parties has
decision-making authority, like education, healthcare,210 and religious
upbringing. Similarly, an agreement that gives the known donor visitation
rights, while relinquishing parental rights, should specify the frequency of
visitation, where the visitation will take place, whether it is supervised by the
legal mother or not, and any limitations on the basis of time, travel, and
activity.211
Furthermore, like all child custody arrangements, the agreement should be
subject to modification. The standard for modification should be changed
circumstances that affect the welfare of the child.212 Changed circumstances
should be broadly defined and may include lack of stability in the living or
childcare situation, the child’s poor performance in school, changes in the child’s
health, and changes in the parents’ circumstances.213 The driving factor behind a
modification should be the best interests of the child. The ability to modify the
donor and mother’s agreement is very important in the ART situation since the
agreement will be reached prior to the child’s conception and the parties’
documented aspirations may either fall short of or supersede the pragmatism of
the arrangement once the child is born.214
Fourth, as previously mentioned, to be enforceable, a written agreement
between the known donor and recipient-mother must not violate public policy.215
One way to determine if a written agreement is valid against public policy is if it
comports with the requirements of uniform acts, such as the UPA.216 I propose
that if a written agreement comports with the requirements of the 2002 UPA,
Article 7: Children of Assisted Reproduction, it does not violate public policy.
Some key guidelines from Article 7 are as follows: A child conceived through
209. Id. at 1257
210. Id.
211. Unfortunately in my research, I was unable to find a sufficiently detailed agreement where a
donor retains full parental rights or where a donor is given visitation rights. This is actually fitting as
it demonstrates the lack of specificity and formality that parties currently exercise in entering into
ART contracts.
212. See Wilson v. Wilson, No. FM-04-298-00, 2006 WL 848128, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
April 3, 2006) (per curiam) (parties seeking to modify custody “must demonstrate changed
circumstances which affect the welfare of the children.”(citations omitted)).
213. See id.
214. See supra Section V and the accompanying discussion about the Mintz case.
215. See supra Section V.
216. See In re Paternity of M.F., 938 N.E.2d 1256, 1259 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (noting that the UPA is
an “excellent tool for ensuring that contracts for these services do not violate our public policy of
protecting the welfare of children.” (citation omitted)).
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sexual intercourse is not a child of assisted reproduction and not subject to
Article 7,217 a licensed physician need not be involved in the procedure for
assisted reproduction,218 the act applies to both married and single women,219
and the determination of parentage is based on which parties intended to parent
the child.220 This last requirement gives the written agreement legal force by
allowing the parties to include their intentions in the contract. Even though the
UPA discusses parentage, I propose that the intent requirement also apply to the
intent to relinquish parental rights and the intent to permit and partake in
visitation rights.
Nothing in the 2002 UPA prevents parties engaging in artificial
insemination from forming a legally binding written agreement.221 Therefore, an
agreement between the parties that gives the known donor visitation rights,
retains his full parental rights, or relinquishes his full parental rights is valid if it
complies with the 2002 UPA. In addition, a written agreement should be found
compliant with public policy if it satisfies the earlier discussion of concerns
raised in Ferguson and Mintz.222 Even if a written agreement complies with the
2002 UPA, if, in reality, it amounts to a legal parent shirking his parental
responsibilities, the contract will not be enforced.
Lastly, it may be a concern that the written agreement requirement imposes
state intervention into the family realm and requires the parties to enlist a
lawyer. While I have considered this in my proposal, I have concluded that,
based on the case law mentioned in this note, and other cases that are not
mentioned, it is in the parties’ best interests to create a formal written agreement
enforceable in a court of law. The written agreement serves to protect the unique
arrangement that the parties have contemplated. If the parties do not commit
their agreement to writing, they leave themselves vulnerable to an unpredictable
and possibly unfavorable outcome if a dispute arises down the line.
In sum, I propose that state law require parties engaging in assisted
reproductive technology to enter into formal, written contracts expressing their
intentions and rights.
VIII. CONCLUSION
As the number of “non-traditional” families increase, it becomes more and
more important for our legislatures to enact laws that enable these new families.
Current law governing determinations of known donors’ rights falls short of this
task and leads to results that do not honor the intentions of parties who utilize
assisted reproductive technology. For this reason, requiring known donors and
recipient-mothers to enter into written, pre-insemination agreements is vital to
ensuring that children of assisted reproductive technology are born into the arms
of their intended caretakers. It is these caretakers who have the child’s best
217. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 701(2002).
218. Id. at § 702 cmnt.
219. Id.
220. See id. at § 703 (“A man who provides sperm for, or consents to, assisted reproduction by a
woman . . . with the intent to be the parent of her child, is a parent of the resulting child.”).
221. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (2002).
222. See supra Section V and accompanying discussion of public policy concerns.
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interests in mind and who are in the best position to love and raise that child.
Private contracting allows for each individual to freely construct his or her family
in a personal and meaningful way. It is incumbent upon U.S. legislatures and
courts to push for changes in the law that will preserve this precious human
inclination to procreate with, parent with, and love whomever one chooses.

